Richard Meade

Richard Meade
Education:

BSc (First Class Honours), 1991 Victoria University of Wellington

BCA Economics and Finance, 1989 Victoria University of Wellington

 

Curriculum Vitae: Download Curriculum Vitae 39kB

Selected publications

Other
Aug
2007
"The Effect of Industry Structure and Institutional Arrangements on Growth and Innovation in the New Zealand Agriculture Sector", 2007. (with Lewis Evans)

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Feb
2007
"Vertical Integration and Market Power in Electricity Markets", 2007. (with Seamus Hogan)

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Feb
2007
"Effect of Changes in Regulatory Quality on Electricity Lines Investment and Reliability in New Zealand", 2007. (with James Tremewan)

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May
2006
"Valuing the Impact of Climate Change Policies on Forestry", New Zealand Journal of Forestry 2006 Vol. 51, No. 1, 14-18

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Feb
2006
"Real Options and Transmission Investment: the New Zealand Grid Investment Test", 2006. (with Glenn Boyle, Graeme Guthrie)

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In this paper, we develop an analytical framework for conceptualising the investment test proposed by this regulator.

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Feb
2006
"The Role and Significance of Cooperatives in New Zealand Agriculture, A Comparative Institutional Analysis", 2006. (with Lewis Evans)

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A report prepared for the New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Finance

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Dec
2005
"Alternating Currents or Counter-Revolution? Contemporary Electricity Reform in New Zealand", VUW Press 2005. , 1-346 (with Lewis Evans)

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May
2005
"Electricity Investment and Security of Supply in Liberalized Electricity Systems", Development of Electricity Markets. Instytyt Elecktroenergetyki Politechniki Lodzkiej 2005. First Edition, 51-85

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This paper contributes to the current debate by deconstructing both the questions that investment-encouraging mechanisms such as capacity markets attempt to answer, and the answers that they provide. It argues that where market imperfections are thought to hinder necessary investment, and the term "necessary" in this context is used guardedly, the introduction of such arrangements are likely to be inferior to instead addressing the causes of
those imperfections. This inferiority stems not only from the fact that these arrangements exacerbate any departures from the "ideals" of market-based reforms, but also because of the inevitable costs associated with imperfect interventions.

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May
2005
"Ownership vs. Regulation in Electricity Reform: The Role of Governance", 2005.

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Recognising that regulation is itself costly, and that market contracting, ownership and regulation are partly substitutable forms of governance, this paper argues that state ownership of natural monopolies in electricity distribution (and transmission) is inefficient. Unregulated
customer ownership of these activities is superior, better aligning monopolist and customer incentives at lower cost.

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Dec
2004
"An Economic Appraisal of Ngai Tipu Whakaritorito: A New Governance Model for Maori Collectives", 2004.

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With the return to centralized industry governance and shift towards heavyhanded regulation - but now with greater private sector investment in the sector - system supply and security issues persist, and questions remain over the likely effect of these policy reversals on required new investment.

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Sep
2004
"Decentralization and Re-centralization of Electricity Industry Governance in New Zealand", 2004.

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With the return to centralized industry governance and shift towards heavyhanded regulation - but now with greater private sector investment in the sector - system supply and security issues persist, and questions remain over the likely effect of these policy reversals on required new investment.

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Sep
2001
"Economic Analysis of Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) with Specific Reference to the Transpower Proposal for New Zealand", 2001. (with Lewis Evans)

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Setting aside certain complications that can arise due to market power, it is a relatively straightforward matter to derive (if not implement) a valuation formula for FTRs, and to relate FTR valuation with the proceeds of the FTR auction, allowing for both taxation and auction efficiency.

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Working Papers

Oct
2007
"Intra-Country Regulation of Share Markets: Does One Size Fit All?", European Journal of Law and Economics, 25 (April 2008), 151-165 (with Glenn Boyle)

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A large body of evidence suggests that investor protection regulation assists the development of major stock exchanges, but this leaves open the question of whether or not the same level of regulation should be applied to all centralised trading platforms.

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Feb
2007
"Vertical Integration and Market Power in Electricity Markets", 2007. (with Seamus Hogan)

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View full details »

Feb
2007
"Effect of Changes in Regulatory Quality on Electricity Lines Investment and Reliability in New Zealand", 2007. (with James Tremewan)

Filetype IconDownload (PDF) 186kB

View full details »

May
2006
"Valuing the Impact of Climate Change Policies on Forestry", New Zealand Journal of Forestry 2006 Vol. 51, No. 1, 14-18

Filetype IconDownload (PDF) 55kB

View full details »

May
2005
"Electricity Investment and Security of Supply in Liberalized Electricity Systems", Development of Electricity Markets. Instytyt Elecktroenergetyki Politechniki Lodzkiej 2005. First Edition, 51-85

Filetype IconDownload (PDF) 571kB

This paper contributes to the current debate by deconstructing both the questions that investment-encouraging mechanisms such as capacity markets attempt to answer, and the answers that they provide. It argues that where market imperfections are thought to hinder necessary investment, and the term "necessary" in this context is used guardedly, the introduction of such arrangements are likely to be inferior to instead addressing the causes of
those imperfections. This inferiority stems not only from the fact that these arrangements exacerbate any departures from the "ideals" of market-based reforms, but also because of the inevitable costs associated with imperfect interventions.

View full details »

May
2005
"Ownership vs. Regulation in Electricity Reform: The Role of Governance", 2005.

Filetype IconDownload (PDF) 321kB

Recognising that regulation is itself costly, and that market contracting, ownership and regulation are partly substitutable forms of governance, this paper argues that state ownership of natural monopolies in electricity distribution (and transmission) is inefficient. Unregulated
customer ownership of these activities is superior, better aligning monopolist and customer incentives at lower cost.

View full details »

Sep
2004
"Decentralization and Re-centralization of Electricity Industry Governance in New Zealand", 2004.

Filetype IconDownload (PDF) 177kB

With the return to centralized industry governance and shift towards heavyhanded regulation - but now with greater private sector investment in the sector - system supply and security issues persist, and questions remain over the likely effect of these policy reversals on required new investment.

View full details »