Richard Meade
BSc (First Class Honours), 1991 Victoria University of Wellington
BCA Economics and Finance, 1989 Victoria University of Wellington
Selected publications
Other
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In this paper, we develop an analytical framework for conceptualising the investment test proposed by this regulator.
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A report prepared for the New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Finance
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This paper contributes to the current debate by deconstructing both the questions that investment-encouraging mechanisms such as capacity markets attempt to answer, and the answers that they provide. It argues that where market imperfections are thought to hinder necessary investment, and the term "necessary" in this context is used guardedly, the introduction of such arrangements are likely to be inferior to instead addressing the causes of
those imperfections. This inferiority stems not only from the fact that these arrangements exacerbate any departures from the "ideals" of market-based reforms, but also because of the inevitable costs associated with imperfect interventions.
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Recognising that regulation is itself costly, and that market contracting, ownership and regulation are partly substitutable forms of governance, this paper argues that state ownership of natural monopolies in electricity distribution (and transmission) is inefficient. Unregulated
customer ownership of these activities is superior, better aligning monopolist and customer incentives at lower cost.
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With the return to centralized industry governance and shift towards heavyhanded regulation - but now with greater private sector investment in the sector - system supply and security issues persist, and questions remain over the likely effect of these policy reversals on required new investment.
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With the return to centralized industry governance and shift towards heavyhanded regulation - but now with greater private sector investment in the sector - system supply and security issues persist, and questions remain over the likely effect of these policy reversals on required new investment.
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Setting aside certain complications that can arise due to market power, it is a relatively straightforward matter to derive (if not implement) a valuation formula for FTRs, and to relate FTR valuation with the proceeds of the FTR auction, allowing for both taxation and auction efficiency.
Working Papers
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A large body of evidence suggests that investor protection regulation assists the development of major stock exchanges, but this leaves open the question of whether or not the same level of regulation should be applied to all centralised trading platforms.
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Download (PDF) 571kB
This paper contributes to the current debate by deconstructing both the questions that investment-encouraging mechanisms such as capacity markets attempt to answer, and the answers that they provide. It argues that where market imperfections are thought to hinder necessary investment, and the term "necessary" in this context is used guardedly, the introduction of such arrangements are likely to be inferior to instead addressing the causes of
those imperfections. This inferiority stems not only from the fact that these arrangements exacerbate any departures from the "ideals" of market-based reforms, but also because of the inevitable costs associated with imperfect interventions.
Download (PDF) 321kB
Recognising that regulation is itself costly, and that market contracting, ownership and regulation are partly substitutable forms of governance, this paper argues that state ownership of natural monopolies in electricity distribution (and transmission) is inefficient. Unregulated
customer ownership of these activities is superior, better aligning monopolist and customer incentives at lower cost.
Download (PDF) 177kB
With the return to centralized industry governance and shift towards heavyhanded regulation - but now with greater private sector investment in the sector - system supply and security issues persist, and questions remain over the likely effect of these policy reversals on required new investment.