Lewis Evans
PhD in Agricultural Economics, Wisconsin, 1976
M.Agr.Sc (Honours 1), Canterbury, 1970
B.Agr.Sc Canterbury, 1965
Download Curriculum Vitae 83kB
Research Interests
Theoretical and Applied Microeconomics
Law
Economics
Selected publications
Academic Journal
Download (PDF) 274kB
We present a model featuring irreversible investment, uncertain future demand and capital prices, and a regulator who sets the firm's output price at discrete intervals.
Download (PDF) 223kB
We show that regulators' price-setting, rate base, and allowed rate of return decisions are inextricably linked.
Download (PDF) 185kB
The Ultimatum game is simple and this facilitates its use in the study of predictions of game theory. Experimental evidence suggests that it does not predict individual behavior well, unless individuals gain welfare from fairness in transactions, or have expectations about some wider game. Our model excludes any notion of fairness by including (potential) rivalry in transactions. In this game the proposer's expectations yield outcomes that are consistent with experimental evidence. Offers can be large or small, with none in an intermediate range. The consequent distribution appears in Dictator game experiments. Our model explains how it is generated by expectations.
Other
Download (PDF) 607kB
Download (PDF) 209kB
In this chapter, we set the competition promoted by the PBRF in context by considering the costs and benefits of competition in the tertiary sector.
Download (PDF) 204kB
We show thast if cooperative's shares are priced at the present value of expected dividends and supplier entry and exit decesions are taken solely on the basis of profitability of membership then there is no ineffeciency and we describe a functioning example. Finally, our valuations show that there is no "time horizon" investment problem, at least from an industry prospective.
Download (PDF) 650kB
In this paper, we undertake a detailed analysis of the approach followed in LINES. We do so from the perspective of a referee who has been asked to provide a review of that report in order to assess its suitability for publication in an edited book or journal that adheres to conventional academic standards. Although LINES has not, of course, been submitted for publication or
review of this kind, its contents and recommendations should nevertheless meet minimum standards of accuracy, thoroughness and consistency. It is these criteria we use to assess LINES.
Download (PDF) 638kB
Investigations into the causes and effects of parallel importing have concentrated on price discrimination, but arbitrage can also occur on non-price dimensions.
Download (PDF) 1.2MB
In this article we consider the tradeable property rights framework as a method of allocating water. Our objectives are to explain why such an approach can improve aspects of New Zealand's current water allocation framework, to establish the appropriate set of institutional arrangements for a tradeable rights framework to operate effectively, and to examine what may influence the value of tradeable water rights.
Download (PDF) 310kB
This paper considers the application of competition law and price regulation in
the very small, and isolated economy that is New Zealand. It argues that the total surplus (efficiency) criterion should be applied in tests of practices and actions where the competition threshold is not met or doubtful. Further, it argues that this criterion is admitted, if not required, under New Zealand statutes. The differential treatment of affected parties, including foreign investors, in measuring the surplus is considered.
Download (PDF) 367kB
We show that when there is a choice between reversible and irreversible technology, there is no price specification under rate of return regulation that will induce the firm to choose the efficient bundle of technology,
Download (PDF) 301kB
This paper reviews three of the economic issues raised by the structure of our accident compensation scheme: the role of incentives, the relationship with the broader insurance market and the costs of government monopoly provision.
Download (PDF) 184kB
This paper provides some economic perspectives on the interaction between contract law and competition (antitrust) law.
Download (PDF) 3.1MB
This paper examines societal welfare produced by regulated firms that have a
significant proportion of their costs generated by irreversible (sunk) investment.
Download (PDF) 191kB
The aim of this paper is to consider the political forces behind these trade reforms with an eye towards explaining the political success of the unilateral approach.
Download (PDF) 105kB
Download (PDF) 120kB
In this paper we use examples of contracts between producers and processors in the forestry, wine and processed vegetable markets to consider the extent to which contracts may provide efficient vehicles for the alignment of interests between producers and processors in agricultural markets.
Download (PDF) 165kB
The paper takes the efficiency objective of the authorisation process under the Commerce Act 1986 as given.
Download (PDF) 80kB
In this paper we provide an economic perspective on the application of competition law to contracts.
Download (PDF) 1.7MB
A report prepared for the New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Finance
Working Papers
Download (PDF) 607kB
Download (PDF) 209kB
In this chapter, we set the competition promoted by the PBRF in context by considering the costs and benefits of competition in the tertiary sector.
Download (PDF) 295kB
We show that a price-taking generator will only generate when the output price exceeds its marginal cost by an amount that reflects the value of the option to delay the use of stored fuel.
Download (PDF) 204kB
We show thast if cooperative's shares are priced at the present value of expected dividends and supplier entry and exit decesions are taken solely on the basis of profitability of membership then there is no ineffeciency and we describe a functioning example. Finally, our valuations show that there is no "time horizon" investment problem, at least from an industry prospective.
Download (PDF) 1.4MB
We study whether the New Zealand market has been a national market or a set of local markets since its inception in 1996.
Download (PDF) 274kB
We present a model featuring irreversible investment, uncertain future demand and capital prices, and a regulator who sets the firm's output price at discrete intervals.
Download (PDF) 638kB
Investigations into the causes and effects of parallel importing have concentrated on price discrimination, but arbitrage can also occur on non-price dimensions.
Download (PDF) 310kB
This paper considers the application of competition law and price regulation in
the very small, and isolated economy that is New Zealand. It argues that the total surplus (efficiency) criterion should be applied in tests of practices and actions where the competition threshold is not met or doubtful. Further, it argues that this criterion is admitted, if not required, under New Zealand statutes. The differential treatment of affected parties, including foreign investors, in measuring the surplus is considered.
Download (PDF) 223kB
We show that regulators' price-setting, rate base, and allowed rate of return decisions are inextricably linked.
Download (PDF) 367kB
We show that when there is a choice between reversible and irreversible technology, there is no price specification under rate of return regulation that will induce the firm to choose the efficient bundle of technology,
Download (PDF) 301kB
This paper reviews three of the economic issues raised by the structure of our accident compensation scheme: the role of incentives, the relationship with the broader insurance market and the costs of government monopoly provision.
Download (PDF) 3.1MB
This paper examines societal welfare produced by regulated firms that have a
significant proportion of their costs generated by irreversible (sunk) investment.
Download (PDF) 191kB
The aim of this paper is to consider the political forces behind these trade reforms with an eye towards explaining the political success of the unilateral approach.
Download (PDF) 105kB
Download (PDF) 58kB
This study provides an economic history of the Internet access market in New Zealand from 1996, essentially the inception of the market, to early 1999. It reviews the strategy literature about entry to new markets and tests a resource-based theory concerning the timing of entry.
Download (PDF) 120kB
In this paper we use examples of contracts between producers and processors in the forestry, wine and processed vegetable markets to consider the extent to which contracts may provide efficient vehicles for the alignment of interests between producers and processors in agricultural markets.
Download (PDF) 165kB
The paper takes the efficiency objective of the authorisation process under the Commerce Act 1986 as given.
Download (PDF) 80kB
In this paper we provide an economic perspective on the application of competition law to contracts.
Download (PDF) 185kB
The Ultimatum game is simple and this facilitates its use in the study of predictions of game theory. Experimental evidence suggests that it does not predict individual behavior well, unless individuals gain welfare from fairness in transactions, or have expectations about some wider game. Our model excludes any notion of fairness by including (potential) rivalry in transactions. In this game the proposer's expectations yield outcomes that are consistent with experimental evidence. Offers can be large or small, with none in an intermediate range. The consequent distribution appears in Dictator game experiments. Our model explains how it is generated by expectations.
Download (PDF) 52kB