Neil Quigley
Wellington
PhD, Toronto, 1986
MA (First Class Honours) Canterbury, 1981
BA, Canterbury, 1979
Download Curriculum Vitae 64kB
Research Interests
Agent Renumeration Strategies
Prduct Design Issues in Insurance Market
Bank Mergers
Competition Policy
Governance and Regulation in Financial Markets
Selected publications
Academic Journal
Other
Download (PDF) 209kB
In this chapter, we set the competition promoted by the PBRF in context by considering the costs and benefits of competition in the tertiary sector.
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This paper provides a model that shows that contracts with these features arise in equilibrium in environments having: i) up-front selling costs that are re-couped from on-going sales, ii) heterogeneous customers, iii) limited sales agent access to capital markets and iv) imperfect commitment by customers and agents to long-term contracts.
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This paper reviews three of the economic issues raised by the structure of our accident compensation scheme: the role of incentives, the relationship with the broader insurance market and the costs of government monopoly provision.
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This paper provides some economic perspectives on the interaction between contract law and competition (antitrust) law.
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In this paper we use examples of contracts between producers and processors in the forestry, wine and processed vegetable markets to consider the extent to which contracts may provide efficient vehicles for the alignment of interests between producers and processors in agricultural markets.
Download (PDF) 80kB
In this paper we provide an economic perspective on the application of competition law to contracts.
Working Papers
Download (PDF) 143kB
Download (PDF) 209kB
In this chapter, we set the competition promoted by the PBRF in context by considering the costs and benefits of competition in the tertiary sector.
Download (PDF) 2.7MB
This paper provides a model that shows that contracts with these features arise in equilibrium in environments having: i) up-front selling costs that are re-couped from on-going sales, ii) heterogeneous customers, iii) limited sales agent access to capital markets and iv) imperfect commitment by customers and agents to long-term contracts.
Download (PDF) 301kB
This paper reviews three of the economic issues raised by the structure of our accident compensation scheme: the role of incentives, the relationship with the broader insurance market and the costs of government monopoly provision.
Download (PDF) 120kB
In this paper we use examples of contracts between producers and processors in the forestry, wine and processed vegetable markets to consider the extent to which contracts may provide efficient vehicles for the alignment of interests between producers and processors in agricultural markets.
Download (PDF) 80kB
In this paper we provide an economic perspective on the application of competition law to contracts.
Download (PDF) 52kB